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Friday, July 26, 2013

These are the old ways of investment #banking: ‘I repaid my clients’ fraud losses out of my own pocket’ - @FT

if you want to be in a business that implies a special degree of trust from customers, you cannot be motivated purely by self-interest; you have to be accountable. These are the old ways of investment banking 
They don't make them like they used to...  Trust and Responsibility seems to be in short supply these days, and not only for the Financial Sector

Read the whole post on the FT website here:  First Person: ‘I repaid my clients’ fraud losses out of my own pocket’ - FT.com

Thursday, July 11, 2013

Property Crushes Hedge Funds in Alternative Markets - Bloomberg


diversifying into alternatives makes sense even if they don't outperform.

Property Crushes Hedge Funds in Alternative Markets

Mackenzie Stroh/Bloomberg Markets
Hamilton "Tony" James says diversifying into alternatives makes sense even if they don't outperform.
“Why would anyone invest in the stock market?”
Hamilton “Tony” James looked up from his notes and peered out at the audience over the rims of his glasses. The investors seated in the chandelier-adorned meeting room of New York’s Waldorf-Astoria hotel had been in their chairs for hours. Yet James paused to let his point sink in. Someone laughed. James, president since 2005 of Blackstone Group LP (BX), was stone-faced.
The occasion was Blackstone’s third annual investor day, Bloomberg Markets magazine reports in its August issue. The firm is the world’s largest manager of so-called alternative investments, with $218 billion under management. It runs private-equity funds and hedge funds, invests heavily in credit securities and owns vast expanses of real estate. One of its properties is the Waldorf itself.
More from the August issue of Bloomberg Markets:
When James finally answered his own question about stocks, he told the audience they were a fool’s game compared with Blackstone’s investment funds, which have returned at least 15 percent annualized during the past 26 years, according to the firm. A good investment lately is Blackstone. The firm’s shares returned 89.4 percent during the 12 months ended on June 10, while still trading below their initial offering price in 2007.
Alternatives such as those managed by Blackstone have gained in popularity during the past 20 years as investors searched for alpha -- returns uncorrelated with and higher than those offered by the broad stock and bond markets.

Celebrity Investing

The people who run companies specializing in alternatives - - including billionaires such as Steve CohenHenry KravisJohn Paulson and Blackstone co-founder Steve Schwarzman -- have become celebrities. Assets overseen by hedge funds alone increased to $1.87 trillion this year from $118 billion in 1997 -- much of it from pension funds, endowments, family offices and sovereign-wealth funds.
Virtually every alternative category crashed in the financial meltdown of 2007 to 2009 -- none more severely than property, with housing and commercial real estate prices falling as much as 40 percent.
Yet as markets have recovered, it’s real estate that has led the way. The sector dominates Bloomberg Markets’ ranking of alternatives, which shows that real estate investment trusts -- which pool investor money to buy property and are sold like stocks -- have gained more than any other alternative category in the past three years. Large-capitalization REITs returned 17.3 percent annualized in the three years from March 31, 2010, to March 28, 2013, besting private equity, which returned 15.2 percent.

Index Search

To find the best-performing unconventional investments, Bloomberg searched its own indexes covering hedge funds, funds of funds, commodities and REITs. Bloomberg’s Rankings team also drew on outside indexes in search for the best-performing private-equity funds and collectibles, such as vintage cars, stamps, contemporary art and wine.
The best bets ranged from corn and silver futures, which returned 33.8 percent and 20.5 percent annualized over three years, to a Chateau Pavie Bordeaux and a 1957 Ferrari 250 Testarossa, which recently sold for $16.4 million.
Among the worst-performing alternatives were hedge funds, which returned 3.3 percent, and funds of hedge funds, which lost money overall. Most alternatives struggled to beat the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX), which returned 12.7 percent annualized over the three years ended on March 28 and was up more than 15 percent this year as of July 10.
James says that investing in alternatives makes sense even when they underperform.

No Correlation

“If you can put a bunch of money into these idiosyncratic investments, then you get a lot of diversification benefit because the returns are very uncorrelated” to the broader markets, he says, speaking from his office 44 floors above Park Avenue in Manhattan. “So even though you are putting a riskier asset in your portfolio, because it’s not correlated with everything else that you own, the portfolio volatility actually comes down.”
For investors in real estate and REITs, valuations fell further and faster than other assets and have in the past three years jumped higher than the S&P 500.
“If you wind the clock back to 2009, real estate had just been through a tremendous crash that helped bring down the global economy,” says Bob Rice, managing partner at New York-based merchant bank Tangent Capital Partners LLC and author of “The Alternative Answer” (HarperBusiness, 2013). “Things that are way down are going to come back. On top of that, central banks have given people a prevalence of cheap money to borrow and get back into alternatives such as real estate.”

Glimcher on Top

The return of consumer confidence has helped drive up REIT share prices by sending shoppers back to the stores. REITs that invest in shopping malls boasted the best performance for the three years ended on March 28, with an annualized return of 25.3 percent, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Leading the list of best-performing mall investors was Michael Glimcher, whose Columbus, Ohio-based Glimcher Realty Trust (GRT) gained 38 percent.
Other categories of REITs that produced 20 percent-plus three-year annualized returns included self-storage units, industrial plants, health care, retail and Asian real estate.
Although REITs are still largely a U.S. phenomenon, they’re also a growing asset class in Europe and Asia. REITs globally raised $22.6 billion in the first quarter of the year, on pace to surpass the record $73.3 billion they collected in 2012.

REITs Triumph

“You’ve had tremendous gains in the assets that REITs are investing in, which is driving enthusiasm and performance,” says Brian Hargrave, chief investment officer at ZAIS Financial Corp. (ZFC), a mortgage-focused REIT run by Red Bank, New Jersey-based asset manager ZAIS Group LLC. “It’s a theme among investors to get exposure to the recovering housing economy.”
For U.S. investors, the advantage of REITs is that they’re required by the Internal Revenue Service to distribute at least 90 percent of their taxable earnings to shareholders as dividends, in exchange for paying little or no corporate income tax.
“That’s probably the single biggest benefit to the investor,” Hargrave says.
Yet real estate is a volatile and cyclical investment, with REIT prices rising and falling along with movements in the larger economy. That became clear in May, when U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s announcement that the Fed might slow its debt-buying program sent bond prices plunging. Shares of mortgage REITs fell 11.2 percent for the month ended July 10.

Leverage Rises

Meanwhile, the real estate moguls whose heavy borrowing helped fuel the 2008 financial crisis are back at it, taking advantage of Federal Reserve-driven low interest rates to amplify their returns through leverage. In an April report, the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Stability Oversight Council cited the borrowing of mortgage REITs as a source of instability in the economy.
“You’re starting to see more and more REITs that are borrowing to pay their dividends,” Tangent Capital’s Rice says. “That’s a bit of a yellow flag in terms of whether you want to be chasing the asset class right now.”
When central banks finally start raising interest rates, that could put a quick end to the new property boom, says David Fann, chief executive officer of TorreyCove Capital Partners LLC, a La Jolla, California-based firm that advises investment managers.
“Real estate has been a huge beneficiary of quantitative easing,” he says, referring to the Federal Reserve program to keep interest rates low by buying mortgage securities and other bonds. “When interest rates begin to rise, that’s going to curtail the longer-term appeal of real estate investing.”

Hedging Losses

Hedge funds, once the quintessential alternative investment, have been disappointing investors for years. The poor performance of macro funds, which make bets on movements in the broad economy, has been a reason for hedge funds’ overall mediocre 3.3 percent return.
Fund-of-funds operators, who try to find the best performers, have done even worse: Those funds lost an annualized 3.8 percent over three years. More than 600 funds of funds, or 25 percent of the total, have gone out of business since 2007. And assets under management in hedge funds have declined 13 percent in that period.
Even as the hedge-fund universe has shrunk, pension funds and other institutional investors have moved their money into the biggest, most successful funds.

‘Index Effect’

“Hedge funds in aggregate are going to look more and more like the broader market as their asset base continues to grow,” says Carl Friedrich, chief investment officer at Woodbury, New York-based investment adviser Piermont Wealth Management Inc. “You get an S&P 500-like index effect.”
Hedge-fund investors smart enough to bet on a rebound in housing via mortgage-backed securities fared well. Those funds gained more than 20 percent annualized during the three-year period. And the best of them, Metacapital Mortgage Opportunities, run by Metacapital Management LP’s Deepak Narula, returned more than 30 percent.
Commodities investors found the best returns in their breakfast cereal bowl: corn. While overall commodities gained a paltry 3.1 percent, corn futures returned 33.8 percent in the three years, as the U.S. government raised the required ethanol content of gasoline. Also, rising incomes in emerging markets increased meat consumption and thus grain purchases to feed the livestock.

Corn Roast

“Corn’s been going up in price over the last few years,” says Paul Ashworth, chief North America economist at London-based research firm Capital Economics Ltd. Ashworth said he believes corn and other agricultural commodities are overpriced and that what he calls a bubble will burst in the next few years. “We’re talking about low interest rates to buy farmland and also higher yields for corn per acre,” he says.
For wealthy individuals, alternative investing isn’t just about hedge funds and commodities. They also sink their money into collectibles such as stamps, coins, art and wine. Among those more-exotic investments, the top performers were classic cars and coins, with indexes that track prices of those collectibles up more than 15 percent annualized over three years.
Art connoisseurs lucky enough to own paintings by the late American artist Adolph Gottlieb (1903 to 1974) saw the value of his works rise by 65.5 percent annualized over three years. One Gottlieb painting, Balance, was sold at a Christie’s auction on May 15 in New York. The auction house’s projected sale price was $800,000 to $1.2 million. It sold for $3.3 million.

Buy Bordeaux

Meanwhile, wine investors who had been holding on to a bottle of 2004 Chateau Pavie Bordeaux saw its value rise 107.3 percent over three years. The wine sold in June for as much as $400 a bottle.
The alternative asset class that has made Blackstone a hot stock, private equity -- aka leveraged buyouts -- has benefited greatly from the post-crisis low-interest-rate environment.
“It’s one of the consequences of the great financial crisis,” TorreyCove’s Fann says. “In many cases, the large deals that were undertaken during the boom period got salvaged because of quantitative easing.”
One beneficiary was Apollo Global Management LLC (APO), the New York-based firm run by Leon Black. Apollo was able to refinance crisis-era debt in companies such as Harrah’s Entertainment Inc. that the firm bought at high prices during the bubble.
Today, private equity is bigger than ever. Global private-equity holdings surpassed $3 trillion of assets under management in 2011 for the first time, according to London-based research company Preqin Ltd., and have continued to grow. KKR & Co. (KKR) -- run by billionaires Kravis and George Roberts, his cousin -- owns companies that employ about 980,000 people. Blackstone’s portfolio of companies boasts more than 730,000 workers, while Apollo companies employ 370,000.

Fundraising Lags

Despite the buyout industry’s benchmark-beating returns, fundraising has lagged in recent years. Private-equity funds in the first quarter had taken an average of 18 months to close, the most in three years, according to Preqin. First-time funds secured just $4 billion globally in the quarter compared with $32 billion in the second quarter of 2008.
Private equity’s solution to the funding problem is to aim lower.
Blackstone, KKR and Carlyle Group LP (CG), the Washington-based buyout firm that manages $176 billion in assets, usually open their doors only to clients willing to commit at least $5 million. In the past year, all three have introduced offerings such as mutual funds and exchange-traded funds to cater directly to individuals.
Chasing 401(k)s
One goal is to penetrate corporate retirement funds, which will hold $5 trillion by 2016, according to Boston-based research firm Cerulli Associates.
“We definitely would like to be part of 401(k) platforms,” says Mike Gaviser, a KKR managing director.
In January, Carlyle started a fund with New York-based investment firm Central Park Group LLC that will accept as little as $50,000 from individual investors. It’s called the CPG Carlyle Private Equity Fund. CPG will allocate money from the pool to Carlyle-managed buyout funds.
“These things are selling like hot cakes right now,” Tangent Capital’s Rice says. “This is the next wave of alternative offerings.”
That’s cause for concern to David John, deputy director of the Retirement Security Project at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
“Should this start to take hold, there needs to be either a licensing, a seal of approval or some level of higher oversight so people don’t find that they are investing in something that really isn’t suitable for their stage of life,” he says.

‘Rational’ Investors

For both institutions and individuals looking for benchmark-beating returns, the world of alternative investing remains alluring.
“We are reaching a point when institutions are basically saying, why shouldn’t we allocate more money to an area with more return?” Blackstone’s Schwarzman told the audience at a Morgan Stanley conference in June. “And the answer is: Any rational person would.”
To contact the reporter on this story: Devin Banerjee in New York at dbanerjee2@bloomberg.net.
To contact the editors responsible for this story: Michael Serrill at mserrill@bloomberg.net; Christian Baumgaertel at cbaumgaertel@bloomberg.net.


Property Crushes Hedge Funds in Alternative Markets - Bloomberg

Why Hedge Funds' Glory Days May Be Gone for Good - Businessweek


As of the end of June, hedge funds had gained just 1.4 percent for 2013 and have fallen behind the MSCI All Country World Index for five of the past seven years

Hedge fund performance lagged the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index by approximately 10 percentage points this year, although most fund managers still charged enormous fees in exchange for access to their brilliance. 

Why Hedge Funds' Glory Days May Be Gone for Good

At the height of the financial crisis in 2008, a group of famous hedge fund managers was made to stand before Congress like thieves in a stockade and defend their existence to an angry public. The gilded five included George Soros, co-founder of the Quantum Fund; James Simons of Renaissance Technologies; John Paulson of Paulson & Co.; Philip Falcone of Harbinger Capital; and Kenneth Griffin of Citadel. Each man had made hundreds of millions, or billions, of dollars in the preceding years through his own form of glorified gambling, and in some cases, the investors who had poured money into their hedge funds had done OK, too. They were brought to Washington to stand up for their industry and their paychecks, and to address the question of whether their business should be more tightly regulated. They all refused to apologize for their success. They appeared untouchable.
What’s happened since then is instructive. Soros, considered by some to be one of the greatest investors in history, announced in 2011 that he was returning most of his investors’ money and converting his fund into a family office. Simons, a former mathematician and code cracker for the National Security Agency, retired from managing his funds in 2010. After several spectacular years, Paulson saw performance at his largest funds plummet, while Falcone reached a tentative settlement in May with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission over claims that he’d borrowed money from his fund to pay his taxes, barring him from the industry for two years. Griffin recently scaled back his ambition of turning his firm into the next Goldman Sachs (GS) after his funds struggled to recover from huge losses in 2008.
As a symbol of the state of the hedge fund industry, the humbling of these financial gods couldn’t be more apt. Hedge funds may have gotten too big for their yachts, for their market, and for their own possibilities for success. After a decade as rock stars, hedge fund managers seem to be fading just as quickly as musicians do. Each day brings disappointing headlines about the returns generated by formerly highflying funds, from Paulson, whose Advantage Plus fund is up 3.4 percent this year, after losing 19 percent in 2012 and 51 percent in 2011, to Bridgewater Associates, the largest in the world.
This reversal of fortunes comes at a time when one of the most successful traders of his time, Steven Cohen, founder of the $15 billion hedge fund firm SAC Capital Advisors, is at the center of a government investigation into insider trading. Two SAC portfolio managers, one current and one former, face criminal trials in November, and further charges from the Department of Justice and the SEC could come at any moment. The Federal Bureau of Investigation continues to probe the company, and the government is weighing criminal and civil actions against SAC and Cohen. Cohen has not been charged and denies any wrongdoing, but the industry is on high alert for the possible downfall of one of its towering figures.
Despite all the speculation and the loss of billions in investor capital, Cohen’s flagship hedge fund managed to be the most profitable in the world in 2012, making $789.5 million in the first 10 months of the year, according to Bloomberg Markets. His competitors haven’t fared as well. One thing hedge funds are supposed to do—generate “alpha,” a macho term for risk-adjusted returns that surpass the overall market because of the skill of the investor—is slipping further out of reach.
According to a report by Goldman Sachs released in May, hedge fund performance lagged the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index by approximately 10 percentage points this year, although most fund managers still charged enormous fees in exchange for access to their brilliance. As of the end of June, hedge funds had gained just 1.4 percent for 2013 and have fallen behind the MSCI All Country World Index for five of the past seven years, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. This comes as the SEC passed a rule that will allow hedge funds to advertise to the public for the first time in 80 years, prompting a flurry of joke marketing slogans to appear on Twitter, such as “Creating alpha since, well, mostly never” (Barry Ritholtz) and “Leave The Frontrunning To Us!” (@IvanTheK).
Hedge funds are built on the idea that a smarter guy (and they are almost all guys; only 16.8 percent of managers are women) with a better computer can make miracles possible by uncovering inefficiencies in the market or predicting the future. In pure dollar terms, there are more resources, advanced degrees, and computing firepower devoted to chasing this elusive goal than almost any other endeavor, and that may include fighting wars. Yet traders face the immutable fact that every second, each megabyte of information, blog post, one-line rumor, revenue estimate, or new product order from China has already been taken into account by the efficient market and reflected in a security’s price. This means that trying to gain what traders call an “edge,” at least legitimately, is almost impossible. As the financial incentives on Wall Street have become enormous, so have the competition and pressure to gain an advantage at any cost.
Few people will shed tears for an industry that has produced more than its fair share of billionaires—some of whom, like Cohen, are notorious for their displays of wealth. Nevertheless, the decline of hedge funds has implications beyond Wall Street. The financial kingpins who profited most from hedge funds’ golden age gained the ability to make influential political donations and to bend big banks to their will. In the U.S., hedge funds manage a significant portion of pension funds and university endowments. For investors who chased the colossal returns once promised, the downturn may well bring painful losses. But it could also be the beginning of a virtuous cycle. If it’s going to survive, the industry may need to get smaller and a lot more modest.
Hedge funds began as a small, almost sideline, service. They were the alternative investments for the wealthy, intended to perform differently than the overall market. “Any idiot can make a big return by taking a big risk. You just buy the S&P, you lever up—there’s nothing clever about that,” says Sebastian Mallaby, the author of More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite. “What’s clever is to have a return that’s risk-adjusted.”
This is what Alfred Winslow Jones, an Australian-born onetime financial journalist, had in mind in 1949 when he created a private investment partnership that was designed to be “hedged” against gyrations in the market. Jones borrowed shares, sold them short, and hoped to earn an offsetting profit on them if the market dropped and his long positions lost value.
It didn’t come without risks: Shorting exposes an investor to potentially limitless losses if a stock keeps rising, so regulators decided that only the most sophisticated investors should be doing it. Hedge funds would be allowed to try to make money almost any way they wanted, and charge whatever fees they liked, as long as they limited their investors to rich people who, in theory, could afford to lose whatever money they put in. It was a side bet.
For a while, the funds were expected to produce steady, modest returns, in contrast to the wider swings of the market. In a 2011 paper that he updated this year, Roger Ibbotson, a finance professor at the Yale School of Management who runs a hedge fund called Zebra Capital Management, analyzed the performance of 8,400 hedge funds from 1995 to 2012; he concluded that on average they generated 2.5 percent of precious alpha. “They have done a good job, historically,” Ibbotson says. “Now, I think it’s overcapacity. I doubt that the alphas are completely gone, but alphas are going to be harder to get in the future than they have been in the past.”
With each millionaire-minting stock market boom, the number of hedge funds has increased as the rich scour the market for new ways to get even richer. It’s no coincidence that the first decade of the 21st century, when the wealthiest 0.1 percent became exponentially wealthier, marked the high-water mark for hedge funds. Now there are about 10,000 hedge funds managing $2.3 trillion. The pioneers, such as Cohen and Paulson, had learned that working at investment banks with their brutal hours and byzantine corporate cultures—not to mention the fighting over bonuses every January—was for suckers. Hedge funds offered would-be financial hotshots a faster and more glamorous path to obscene wealth.
One of the most alluring aspects of the business vs. other sectors of Wall Street is what people in the tech world call “scalability.” Hedge fund managers could easily expand their annual bonuses from millions a year to tens of millions or more just by bringing in more investor money and making the fund larger, often with little extra work. Most hedge funds charge a management fee of 2 percent of assets, which is intended to cover expenses and salaries, as well as 20 percent of the profit generated by the fund at the end of the year. A fund managing $300 million would take $6 million in fees, plus its 20 percent cut; if the fund grew to $3 billion in assets, the management fee would jump to $60 million. If a fund of that size returned only 6 percent that year, it would generate $180 million in profit, $36 million of which the managers could keep. It quickly starts to look like a smart use of a Harvard degree.
Yet this once hugely lucrative model has proven unsustainable. One chief investment officer at a $5 billion institution breaks down the typical hedge fund life cycle into four evolutionary stages. During the early period, when a fund is starting out, its managers are hungry, motivated, and often humble enough to know what they don’t know. This tends to be the best time to put money in, but also the hardest, as the funds tend to be very small. Stage two occurs once the fund has achieved some success, when those making the decisions have gained some confidence but they aren’t yet so well-known that the fund is too big or impossible to get into.
Then comes stage three—the sort of plateau before the fall—when the fund gets “hot” and suddenly has to beat back investors, who tend to be drawn to flashy success stories like lightning bugs to an electric fence. Stage four occurs when the fund manager’s name is spotted as a bidder for baseball teams or buyer of zillion-dollar Hamptons mansions. Most funds stop generating the returns they once did by this stage, as the manager becomes overconfident in his abilities and the fund too large to make anything that could be described as a nimble investing move. “The bigger a fund gets, the more difficult it gets to maintain strong performance,” says Jim Liew, an adjunct professor of finance at New York University’s Stern School of Business. “That’s just because the number of opportunities is limited in terms of putting that much money to work.”
Hedge funds have also been hurt by their success. Most of the advantages their investors once had—from better information to far fewer people trying to do what they do—have evaporated. In the easy, early days, there was less than $500 billion parked in a couple thousand private investment pools chasing the same inefficiencies in the market. That’s when equities were traded in fractions rather than decimals and before the SEC adopted Regulation FD, which in 2000 tightened the spigot of information flowing between company executives and hungry traders.
After 2000, the supposed “smart” money began paying expert network consultants—company insiders who work as part-time advisers to Wall Street investors—to give them the information they craved. The government has since cracked down on that practice, which in some cases led to illegal insider trading. The rise of supercharged computer trading means speed is one of the few ways left to gain an advantage.
As their returns have fallen, the biggest hedge funds have started to seem more like glorified mutual funds for the wealthy, and those rich folks might start to take a harder look at whether they’re getting their money’s worth. This could be an encouraging development for the world economy, considering that hedge funds provided huge demand for the toxic mortgage derivatives that helped lead to the financial collapse of 2008. At the same time, the tens of billions that pension funds have plowed into funds such as Bridgewater’s All Weather Fund—down 8 percent for the year as of late June, according to Reuters, compared with a 10.3 percent rise in the S&P 500—mean that the financial security of untold numbers of retirees could be threatened by a full-scale hedge fund meltdown.
For the moment, that possibility seems remote. The age of the multibillionaire celebrity hedge fund manager may be drawing to a close, but the funds themselves can still serve a useful purpose for prudent investors looking to manage risk. Let the industry’s recent underperformance serve as a reality check: No matter how many $100 million Picasso paintings they purchase, hedge fund moguls are not magicians. The sooner investors realize that, the better off they will be.



Why Hedge Funds' Glory Days May Be Gone for Good - Businessweek